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Traditional theories of motor skill learn-
ing (e.g., Fitts and Posner, 1967) and
many contemporary perspectives in sport
psychology (see Masters and Maxwell,
2008) and cognitive neuroscience (see
Yarrow et al., 2010) argue that skilled
action is guided by procedural or implicit
knowledge. Researchers adopting this per-
spective believe that skilled performance
proceeds rapidly, efficiently and without
the need for conscious monitoring, or a
reliance on propositional knowledge (what
some might term declarative or explicit
knowledge) to guide an activity. However,
in a recent paper published in this jour-
nal, Stanley and Krakauer (2013) present a
compelling argument which offers a stern
challenge to the latter of these assump-
tions. Drawing on evidence from famous
cases in neuroscience (e.g., the case of
HM) and other research on the nature
of skill, Stanley and Krakauer (2013)
suggest that becoming proficient at any
motor task, and maintaining and improv-
ing one’s skill in that activity, is heavily
influenced by the use of what they refer
to as “knowledge of facts” (i.e., proposi-
tional knowledge). The aim of this brief
commentary is to build on Stanley and
Krakauer’s work by pointing to empirical
evidence (e.g., Collins et al., 1999), recent
theory (e.g., Shusterman, 2009) and phe-
nomenological descriptions (e.g., Cotterill
et al., 2010) which suggest that “contin-
uous improvement” at the elite level of
sport is mediated by the “ongoing accrual
and improving application of knowledge
of facts about an activity” (Stanley and
Krakauer, 2013, p. 2). More specifically,
the current paper presents evidence which
demonstrates how performers use knowl-
edge of facts in two distinct sporting situa-
tions: (1) in the training context when the
performer is seeking to improve “attenu-
ated” movement patterns and (2) during
the planning and strategizing that occurs
in pre-performance routines during on-
line competitive performance.
First, let us consider how elite ath-
letes might use knowledge of facts to
alter and improve movements in the prac-
tice context. According to Stanley and
Krakauer (2013) the “use of knowledge
to select actions continues in the skilled
state because there is always the possi-
bility to perform new actions based on
further knowledge and then develop acu-
ity at these actions” (p. 7). This appears
to be precisely what happens in sport
where elite level performers are driven
by a desire to learn “new and better
techniques” (Breivik, 2007, p. 127). For
example, Padraig Harrington, the three-
time major Golf champion, explained that
he consciously sought to improve his
technique throughout his entire career
because “what I do every day is keep
trying to evolve” (Eden, 2013). Indeed,
there is a growing body of empirical
evidence to suggest that conscious and
deliberate attempts to refine and improve
one’s movement proficiency are a ubiq-
uitous feature of elite performer’s train-
ing regimes (see Collins et al., 1999; Ravn
and Christensen, in press). Skill refine-
ment might require the performer to draw
on knowledge of facts on two occasions.
Initially, performers may use “somesthetic
awareness” (i.e., “a proprioceptive feel of
what they are doing”; see Shusterman,
2009, p. 138) to identify problematic
movements during competition. Here, the
performer will draw on factual knowl-
edge (which is established with the help
of a coach in the practice context) about
optimal movement positions and com-
pare it to the kinesthetic feedback they
receive from their current movement pat-
tern in the performance context. Next,
a coach may use “contrast” drills (see
Collins et al., 1999) during training to
increase the athlete’s conscious aware-
ness and understanding (thereby building
on their propositional knowledge) of the
correct (desired) vs. incorrect (current)
movement positioning.
Second, skilled athletes may draw on
propositional knowledge when strategiz-
ing during the pre-performance routine in
closed-skilled sports (e.g., golf). To illus-
trate, in a naturalistic investigation of the
attentional foci adopted by elite golfers
during competition, Bernier et al. (2011)
found that participants used the pre-shot
routine to calculate how certain environ-
mental factors (e.g., the strength of the
wind) would influence the shape and tra-
jectory of their tee-shot. Following this,
elite golfers may rehearse their swing to
establish a “proprioceptive feel” for accu-
rate execution of the stroke (see Nicholls
and Polman, 2008). In another study,
Cotterill et al. (2010) discovered that elite
golfers used the pre-performance rou-
tine to identify the risks associated with
a particular choice of stroke. Elite golfers
appear to bring previous experiences (e.g.,
those accrued during a practice round) to
bear on current problems encountered in
the competitive context. Together, these
phenomenological descriptions suggest
that elite athletes’ can retrieve detailed
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knowledge structures from long-term
memory and then re-instate them in
working memory to mediate planning
and problem-solving during competition.
Here performers seem to employ the cor-
rect “average action” which, according to
Stanley and Krakauer (2013), is “selected
from a large potential repertoire. . . based
on ever-accumulating knowledge of the
task” (p. 9).
The research literature on the cognitive
psychology and neuroscience of skill has
tended to present a dichotomized view
of the role knowledge plays in guiding
skilled performance. According to this
body of work, skilled performers engage in
intuitive or absorbed coping (see Dreyfus
and Dreyfus, 1980) which is predicted to
facilitate movement and performance pro-
ficiency, or they use declarative knowledge
to monitor or control movement which
is predicted to have deleterious conse-
quences (see Masters and Maxwell, 2008).
Such perspectives appear to represent an
unfortunate oversimplification. Indeed, a
closer inspection of relevant studies sug-
gests that elite performers are actually
quite adept at switching between top-
down cognitive processing (i.e., drawing
on explicit rules) and bottom-up, embod-
ied feeling and action (i.e., relying on
spontaneity) and vice versa. This may
happen, for example, when they relin-
quish spontaneity and use knowledge
of facts to alter “attenuated” movement
patterns in the practice context or when
they are strategizing during competitive
performance. Although Stanley and
Krakauer (2013) use an example of how
skilled performers demonstrate knowl-
edge of what to do to initiate an action,
the current paper provides evidence of
how skill may be continually improved
by proprioceptive knowledge of how to
change/alter an action and how perfor-
mance proficiency may be maintained by
propositional knowledge of how best to plan
an action during competition.
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